DoT and DoH: same goal, different disguise
DoT (RFC 7858, 2016) wraps DNS queries in TLS over TCP port 853. DoH (RFC 8484, 2018) sends them as HTTPS requests over port 443.
The practical difference: port 853 is easy to spot and block at a firewall; DoH blends in with the rest of web traffic. That makes it harder to block without disrupting normal browsing.
Opportunistic vs. strict mode
In opportunistic mode (Android's Automatic or Chrome's current-provider option), the client tries to encrypt and, if that fails, falls back to regular DNS on port 53. It works on any network, but an active attacker can trigger that downgrade.
In strict mode, the client requires encryption with a specific, authenticated server. If it can't get it, resolution fails. It's safer on a hostile network and less forgiving with networks that filter DNS.
What encrypted DNS doesn't cover: IP and SNI
After resolving the name, the browser opens a TLS connection. In the first message (ClientHello) it sends the site name in plaintext, the SNI, so the server knows which certificate to present. The destination IP address is always visible as well.
Encrypted Client Hello (ECH), published as RFC 9849 in March 2026, encrypts that first message. Firefox began rolling it out with version 118. It only works if both browser and server support it, and the RFC itself notes that observers can still tell you're connecting to a particular provider.
Centralization and managed networks
Encrypting to a big public resolver concentrates a very valuable log in a few companies. Look for clear terms of service, and keep in mind DNSSEC, which signs responses so forgeries can be detected regardless of transport.
In organizations, DoH can bypass corporate DNS filtering. Chrome doesn't allow secure DNS on managed devices, and Firefox turns it off with enterprise policies, parental controls, or when the network signals not to use it. CISA has published encrypted DNS implementation guidance for federal agencies, and admins have policies to allow, prohibit, or require DoH.